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 The United States Marine Transportation System (MTS) makes large contributions to the 
nation’s economy, security, safety, and quality of life. Strategic investment, planning, 
administrative and operational decisions by government at all levels are necessary to maintain the 
marine transportation system performance at all times, which in turn requires a technical approach 
and professional leadership based on research. This study describes the approach and results of an 
ongoing research effort to assess the resiliency of port operations following major disasters and 
other disruptive events. The work presented in this research uses a set of archival data from the 
United States Coast Guard’s Nationwide Automatic Identification System (NAIS) to quantify the 
state of resiliency by investigating the operation of coastal navigation systems before, during and 
after disruptive events.   
To illustrate the ability of proposed methodology to assess the resiliency of a marine 
transportation system, two case studies representing two different types of infrastructure disruption 
are presented. The first case study involves the disruption that resulted from a collision in March 
2014 in Texas in the Houston Ship Channel as a no-notice event. The second was a disruption 
caused by Superstorm Sandy in 2012 on the greater Port of New York/New Jersey as a pre-notice 
event. The results of this study revealed the importance of AIS data as a source of quantitative data 
when seeking post-disaster measures of resiliency. From an application viewpoint, the methods 
and results presented herein can be adapted and implemented to quantitatively evaluate the amount 
of port specific service loss and the levels of port activity following disruptive events.
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
Worldwide, marine transportation networks facilitate the movement of nearly 90 percent 
of total world trade and 60 percent of global fuel and oil delivery[1]. In 2011, U.S. foreign and 
domestic waterborne trade totalled more than 2.1 billion metric tons of goods, with 62.5 percent 
of this total bound for international destinations [2].  This total also accounted for about 15 percent 
of total global waterborne trade activity.  Waterborne shipping has increased at an average annual 
rate of nearly one percent between 2009 and 2012 [3] . This trend is expected to continue, if not 
increase significantly, as emerging markets enter the global economy. 
The United States Marine Transportation System (MTS) is a complex network consisting 
of hundreds of deep-draft coastal ports connected to thousands of miles of inland river channels 
and other navigable waterways. As with most interdependent, dynamic networks, domestic and 
international supply chains are susceptible to disruptions, because even a single severe event can 
have cascading effects that can disrupt freight transportation throughout the overall system.  
Similar to traffic backups on interstate freeways, disruptions in navigation channels can also cause 
delays and congestion that propagates rapidly and widely throughout the broader MTS. This leads 
to concerns that even a single, isolated, disruptive event such as a storm, terrorist act, or shipping 
accident can have devastating system-wide impacts.  
The threat of natural disasters and human-caused disruptions has driven the need for robust 
and objective performance evaluation methods to quantify the resiliency of maritime transportation 
systems. The term resiliency, as used in this research, refers to how “system functionality” is 
affected due to a disruptive event and how the “system” is able to recover over time from a 
distressed state into normalcy [4]. Previous work in this area has found that, in general, measures 
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of time, cost, capacity, and environmental impact should be included to evaluate overall MTS 
performance [5]. However, the real challenge has been in recognizing quantifiable and reliable 
parameters which are consistently collected and archived to enable the initial disruptive impacts 
to be quantified and also allow the subsequent recovery characteristics of maritime systems to be 
analyzed in terms of resiliency.  
In this vein, the work presented here introduces new methods for the assessment of MTS 
resiliency using archival data from the U.S. Coast Guard’s (USCG) Nationwide Automatic 
Identification System (NAIS), which collects real-time traffic data on waterborne vessels that 
operate in the U.S. territorial waters (USCG Acquisition Directorate, 2013).  Automatic 
Identification System technology was primarily developed to aid in the improvement of marine 
safety and maritime domain awareness. Transceivers on board the vessels broadcast an AIS signal 
via very high frequency (VHF) band radio waves, which relay their position, heading, speed, and 
other identifying information to shore-based towers with a reporting interval of only several 
seconds. Thus, NAIS data is primarily intended for collision avoidance and general maritime 
domain awareness (MDA) to improve safety and security, support search and rescue efforts, and 
enhance environmental stewardship [6]. In addition to provide a “live picture” of waterway traffic 
conditions, the NAIS provides an archive of MTS activity covering several years of individual 
vessel position reports.  Among other valuable research endeavors, this large archived dataset 
enables rigorous, quantitative analysis of vessel patterns and waterway performance trends in both 
coastal and inland navigable waterways.  
The research summarized in this study has adapted a set of archival NAIS data for 
resiliency analyses of coastal port operations following disruptive events. As part of this effort, 
archival vessel position reports were used to establish a baseline of navigation channel and port 
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operations under routine non-event conditions.  Observed losses in system functionality following 
a major disruption were used to quantify the resiliency of the waterway using a time-dependent 
performance analysis. This type of analysis is critical when investigating the efficacy of the 
recovery process protocols and management strategies employed in the days and weeks following 
a major disruptive event.  
The new metrics adopted in this study to assess the resiliency of marine transportation 
systems are followed by two case studies representing two different types of infrastructure 
disruption. These illustrate the ability of the methodology developed in this research to estimate 
the resiliency of waterway infrastructure in pre and post-event conditions. In the case studies, the 
measurement of system resiliency was expressed in terms of vessel dwell time and net vessel 
transit counts into and out of the port area, respectively.  Recent disruptions experienced in critical, 
high-use commercial ports were analyzed: the closure of the Houston Ship Channel in Texas in 
March 2014 following a collision of a bulk carrier with an underway barge tow, and the disruptions 
to the Port of New York-New Jersey after Superstorm Sandy in October 2012.  
1.1  Research Motivation 
 When an infrastructure system faces a disruptive event, substantial losses occur not only 
in the affected system, but also in other infrastructures, since these systems are interdependent. 
Therefore, it is necessary to make the infrastructure network system less susceptible to disruptions, 
by increasing the shock-absorbance capacity (decreasing vulnerability & increasing survivability) 
of the system at the time of disruption and improving the recoverability of the system after the 
disruptive event; that is to incorporate resilience into infrastructure systems.  To provide insight 
into the current resiliency-level of the system, resiliency metrics need to be identified and 
quantitatively evaluated. [7] 
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1.2  Research Approach 
Several studies have been conducted to define resiliency in infrastructure network. Prior 
studies have also investigated methods to improve the resilience of MTS at an abstract level. 
However, little work has been contributed toward identifying and establishing quantifiable metrics 
to measure the resiliency level of infrastructure systems at various stages.  This study adopted a 
method to estimate the resiliency levels of a Marine Transportation System before, during, and 
after-disruption, through a set of quantitative metrics based on system specific performance: dwell 
time and transit count. This study used summary of archival NAIS data to analyze resiliency levels 
of coastal port operations (dwell time and transit count) in pre and post-shock conditions. Two 
types of disruptive events were studied in this research: no-notice event (closure of the Houston 
Ship Channel in Texas in March 2014), and pre-notice event (disruptions to the Port of New York-
New Jersey after Superstorm Sandy in October 2012).  In the two case studies, two metrics were 
introduced to measure the system resiliency levels in pre and post-event conditions: vessel dwell 
time (RDT), and net vessel transit counts (RTC) into and out of the port area, respectively. The 
proposed resiliency metrics can be used to evaluate on a practical level the resiliency level of an 
infrastructure system after the occurrence of a disruptive event.   
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CHAPTER 2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Much of the existing body of knowledge on disruptive events for infrastructure systems 
has focused on security policies such as protective action, prevention, and risk mitigation [8]. 
Fundamentally, this approach overlooks the need to design systems which adapt to disruptive 
events while maintaining a desirable level of service [9]. For a system to be better prepared for a 
disruption, it is desirable to mitigate the likelihood of an event occurrence and design for adaptive 
and robust systems which maintain some level of service during and after a disruptive event. To 
this end, Attoh-Okine et al., (2009) [10] developed a resiliency index for urban infrastructure. Li 
and Lence (2007) [11] used the ratio of the probability of failure over recovery as a measure within 
water resources systems to formulate a resiliency index. For telecommunications networks, Omer 
et al., (2009) [12] proposed a quantitative approach to measure resiliency using the ratio of value 
delivery of a system after disruption to the value delivery before disruption. Reed et al (2009) [13] 
used power outages and restorations after Hurricane Katrina in 2005 to estimate the resiliency of 
interdependent systems after a natural disaster.  
From the few examples outlined above, it is clear that there is no consistent, quantitative 
approach to define resiliency among the many fields and disciplines of infrastructure networks. To 
address this issue, Henry and Ramirez-Marquez (2012) first proposed a fundamentally quantitative 
approach to estimating resilience that is applicable to various disciplines. They proposed resiliency 
as a time-dependent function where system deliverables are quantified for the duration 
encompassing before, during, and after a disruptive event. This approach was also applied to 
stochastic systems in subsequent work [14] [15]. This chapter covers three major components of 




 Marine Transportation System network (MTSN): this section explains the role and 
components of MTSN in international and national scales; as well as potential risks, 
threats and disruptions to MTSN that affect the MTS performance. 
 Resiliency: in this section, the concept of resiliency in general and in MTS specifically; 
components and characteristics of MTS resiliency; and alternate methods to evaluate 
MTS resiliency are described. 
 Automatic Identification System (AIS): this section describes the AIS technology, and 
applications of NAIS technology (Nation-wide Automatic Identification System) in 
general and in MTSN specifically. 
 
 
MTSN    Resilience 
 
 
         AIS 
Figure 1a. Summary of literature review 
 2.1 Marine Transportation System Network (MTSN) 
To clearly provide dimensions of Marine Transportation System (MTS) resiliency in the 
next sections, it is instructive to summarize total number and types of vessels in operation to clarify 
the importance of MTS in transportation: The total number of world ships were reported to be 
46,222 in 2005, including 18,150 cargo ships, 11,356 tankers, 6,139 bulk carriers, 3,165 container 
ships, and 6,139 passenger ships. In 2011, 7,836 U.S. oceangoing vessels made 68,036 calls at 
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U.S. ports, of which 35 percent were by tankers, 32.5 percent were by containerships, 16.1 percent 
dry bulk vessels, 9.1% were by Roll-On/Roll-Off (Ro-Ro) vessels, and 5.9 percent were by general 
cargo ships [2]. The increase of waterborne shipping from 30,686 billion ton-mile in 2006 to 
33,000 billion ton-mile in 2008 represents an average annual increase rate of approximately 4 
percent increase in shipping, which is expected to increase at a similar trend.  Table-1 compares 
the rate of change of total waterborne trade shipping (inbound and outbound) between 2006 and 
2012 in the U.S. and world, respectively. As shown in the table, waterborne trade shipping was 
affected by the great recession of 2008-9. 
Table 1. Waterborne shipping [3] 
 
 
2.2  Potential Threats, Risks and Disruptions to MTS 
Any significant delay, interruption, or stoppage in the flow of waterborne trade caused by 
natural disaster, heightened threat level, an act of terrorism, or any Transportation Security 
Incident (TSI) are defined as a transportation disruption, as stated by U.S. Coast Guard Strategy 
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for Maritime Safety, Security and Stewardship, January 19, 2007, and in section 70101(6) of title 
46, United States Code (https://www.uscg.mil/directives/ci/16000-16999/CI_16000_28A.pdf). 
Sources of disruptions were categorized by Mansouri et al into the following groups: [7] 
 Natural factors: disruptions due to damage caused by nature, such as hurricane 
 Human factors: disruptions caused by humans operating or using the system, such as 
human errors or terrorist attacks 
 Organizational factors: disruptions that occur due to events at organizational level, such 
as worker strikes 
 Technical factors: failure in system components, such as faulty or outdated equipment 
2.3 Definition of Resiliency  
The term resiliency comes from the Latin verb resilire, meaning to rebound or recoil 
(Concise Oxford Dictionary, Tenth Edition). There is no evidence of scholarly work in resiliency 
until Thomas Tredgold introduced the term in 1818 to outline the properties of timber as a 
construction material in tolerating various loads.  In 1860’s, Robert Mallet developed the concept 
of resiliency in marine transportation by incorporating the two newly introduced ideas of resiliency 
and sustainability in the design and construction of navy ships. Mallet’s work focused on assessing 
the ability of materials used in different parts of the vessel to withstand sudden forces and sever 
conditions. One of the other early studies of resiliency was done as a system property in the ecology 
area by C.S. Holling, who initially defined it as “the ability of ecological systems to absorb changes 
of environment variables and still persist”. Used widely in different disciplines from environmental 
research and socioecological systems to material science, psychology, construction and computer 
science, resiliency is often described as the ability of a system to bounce back after a disruptive 
event and return back to its normal functional condition within the least amount of time, cost, and 
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effort. Fiksel depicted resiliency in the system that has the “ability to return to a stable equilibrium 
state after a perturbation” [16]. Rose and Liao defined resiliency as the “ability of the system to 
apply adaptive responses in the face of disruptions in order to avoid potential losses” [17]. It is 
noted in the Infrastructure Security Partnership that a resilient infrastructure sector would “prepare 
for, prevent, protect against, respond, or mitigate any anticipated or unexpected significant threat 
or event” and “rapidly recover and reconstitute critical assets, operations, and services with 
minimum damage and disruption” [18]. Focusing on natural disasters and specifically on post-
event response, Comfort (1999, p. 21) defines resilience as ‘‘the capacity to adapt existing 
resources and skills to new situations and operating conditions”. The use of term resiliency in such 
context implies both system’s strength in reducing post-event network failure probabilities as well 
as system’s flexibility in coping with and minimizing hazard-related losses while maximizing 
recovery.  
2.4 Components and Characteristics of MTS Resiliency  
The initial target of the MTS was to provide safety and efficiency of waterway systems, 
mostly in the case of natural disasters. After the terrorist attacks of September 2011, however, the 
Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) program was implemented into MTS by the Department of 
Homeland Security in which the focus of the MTS was shifted from safety to security to protect 
the infrastructure system from both natural and manmade hazards. Since the complete protection 
of systems against all disasters is impossible, the MTS focus is being changed from CIP to Critical 
Infrastructure Resiliency (CIR), in which instead of trying to reduce the occurrence of the disasters, 
the probability of system’s vulnerability to natural and manmade disasters is reduced.  
The two main components of CIR in MTS are summarized as system’s vulnerability and 
system's coping capacity [19] or adaptive capacity [20]. Systems with lower vulnerability are less 
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influenced by disruptions and thus are less susceptible to harm, while systems with higher response 
capacity have greater “ability to adjust to a disturbance, moderate potential damage, take advantage 
of opportunities, and cope with the consequences of a transformation that occurs” [21]  
Previous studies introduced techniques to reduce vulnerability and increase coping capacity 
of the MTS to optimize the system’s resiliency. The vulnerability reduction strategies include the 
implementation of the following characteristics into the system: [7] 




 Rapidity  
whereas the scenarios to increase the coping capacity of the system cover the employment of the 




 Cognition  
Figure 1b shows the performance levels of a resilient system at three stages of original, 




Figure 1b. Performance levels of a resilient system 
Figure 1c compares the performance characteristics of a resilient system and a traditional non-
resilient system following a disruption. 
Figure 1c. Performance comparison, Resilient vs. non-resilient system 
Resiliency can be interpreted as a quality framework within which lies a system that shows 
the following characteristics during and  after a shock-event: [22] 
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 Minimized probabilities of system failure 
 Minimized consequences of partial or full failure of system if it occurs, in terms of hazard-
related damages to the network, and negative economic and social impacts 
 Optimized (quick) recovery  
In summary, a resilient system can be explained as a system with the ability to reduce the 
probabilities of being affected by a shock, increase the shock absorbance capacity if a shock ever 
occurs to the system, maintain and ideally maximize quantifiable portions of the system’s 
serviceability and adaptive capacity during and after event, and develop a quick recovery to the 
normal or above-normal conditions. [7]  
2.5  Alternate Methods of Assessing Infrastructure Resiliency 
Previous studies suggest a post-event loss assessment method as a mean to determine the 
current resiliency stage of the system to establish resiliency improvement techniques based on the 
identified system resiliency level. Different MTS-related disruptive events including hurricanes, 
vessel collisions, or oil spills can cause various shocks to the system network and consequently 
impact the system’s ability to function. In this paper, port resiliency measurements were defined 
in terms of normal MTS performance capacity, remaining adapted post-event performance, and 
the amount of MTS serviceability loss. Building upon previous studies by M. Omer et al., the 
following metrics have been introduced in the literature to quantify MTSN resiliency: 
 Time Resiliency (RT) 
 Capacity Count (Loading) Resiliency (RL) 
 Cost Resiliency (RC) 
 Environmental Resiliency (RE) 
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Following a disruption, not only is the time needed to travel to and from the disrupted port 
increased, but also the amount of freight loads being transported between the origin and destination 
ports and the total cost of shipping are negatively impacted based on the size of back-log. After 
conducting vessels dwell time analysis as a means of quantifying the port resiliency, the loss 
assessment method is proposed in this study to monetarily translate the corresponding loss of the 
four resiliency metrics after a disruptive event in to precisely identify the current resiliency level 
of the network system. In the following sections, each of the four MTS resiliency metrics is briefly 
discussed.  
2.5.1 Time Resiliency (RT) 
Time resiliency of a port consists of two components: dwell time resiliency (RDT), and 
disruption duration resiliency (RDD). Dwell time (DT) represents the time a vessel spends in the 
same position, area, or stage of a process within the port or its extension. It fundamentally refers 
to the timeframe from the moment the cargo arrives in the port to the time it leaves the port 
(difference between time of entrance and time of departure). Representing the ”capability of the 
port to efficiently handle cargo flows at the terminals and beyond” [23], dwell time in ports 
accommodates vessels waiting time for berth, mooring time in, waiting time for gangs, working 
time, preparation for sailing, and mooring time out [24]. Various ports allow for different DT 
averages for each of the inbound and outbound vessel categories, depending on the port 
performance, capacity and demand. A decrease in the port performance capacity following a 
disruption confines the number of vessels to be processed at any given post-event time unit, which 















𝐷𝑇 0  = average dwell time under normal conditions 
𝐷𝑇 𝑖   = average dwell time after a disruptive event 
Dwell Time Resiliency (RDT) ranges from 0 to 1, where the smaller ratio represents a less 
resilience implemented port. RDT results greater than 1 represent a system that recovers to an 
above-normal condition. 
Disruption duration (RDD) is the other component of the MTS time resiliency (RT). Ranging from 
a few days to several weeks, the length of the disruption absorbed by the port quantifies the 
resilience quality of the infrastructure network. The more resilient the MTSN, the shorter the time 
the port performs under disrupted quality or partial failure.  
2.5.2 Transit Count Resiliency (RTC) 
The capacity of the port in sending and receiving shipments loads decreases after the 
occurrence of a disruptive event. Regulatory information on the normal load processing capability 
of the port in both inbound and outbound shipping flow is required to quantify the amount of port’s 
load processing loss during disruption. Figure 2.1 and 2.2 show the changes in port loading (transit 
count) capacity and dwell-time at different time segments of before, during, and after a disruption. 
As shown in the figure, maximum dwell time (bottom figure) occurs when the port performs at its 




Figure 2.1 (top figure): MTS performance (transit count),  after event 
Figure 2.2 (bottom figure): MTS performance (dwell time), after event 
Transit count resiliency (transit count resiliency, loading resiliency) of a port can be calculated 






𝑇𝐶 0 ∗  𝑡 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙




𝜑 𝑖  = port transit capacity following a disruption 
𝜑 0   = port transit capacity under normal conditions 
𝑇𝐶 0 = transit count under normal condition 
𝑡 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  = duration of the disruptive event 
𝑇𝐶 𝑖  = transit count after disruption 
𝑡 𝑖  = transit count during the time period I after disruption 
n  =  number of time periods in a disruptive event 
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2.5.3 Cost Resiliency (RC) 
A disruptive event negatively impacts the cost of shipping and waterway transportation by 
increasing the cargo dwell time (wait time) and decreasing the port’s freight flow capacity (service 
capacity). This imposes other indirect and overhead costs and results in an increased cost of 
waterway freight transportation per mile-tone following a disruption. Cost resiliency of a port can 







𝐶 0 + 𝑪 𝒙 
=  
𝐶 0
𝐶 0 + (𝐶 𝑑𝑒𝑝 + 𝐶 𝑜𝑣ℎ + 𝐶 𝑎𝑙𝑡) 
 




𝐶 0  = transportation cost under normal condition 
𝐶 𝑖   = transportation cost during disruption 
𝐶 𝑥  = loss due to disruption 
𝐶 𝑑𝑒𝑝 = value depreciation cost 
𝐶 𝑜𝑣ℎ = overhead cost  
𝐶 𝑎𝑙𝑡 = alternate transportation cost  
The loss cost (C x) due to disruption includes the depreciation of the value of goods during 
transportation, overhead costs such as administration, security, scans, customs, and the cost of 
transport by alternative means per mile-ton. 
2.5.4 Environmental Resiliency (RE) 
A disruptive event in most cases causes damages to the natural environment. A damaged 
ecosystem requires a lot of effort, time and money to recover from disturbances and return to the 
normal pattern. Environmental resilience is defined as the amount of disturbance that an ecosystem 
can withstand without changing self-organized processes and structures.  For example, in the 
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March 22, 2014, Galveston bay oil spill took over 40 days to completely collect the oil from the 
water surface, which resulted in threatening several underwater species. In many cases, it is very 
difficult and sometimes impossible to evaluate the costs resulting from damages to biological and 
natural existence. These assessments, typically taking several years, involve the design and 
development of a plan to restore damaged areas, and require some negotiation with the responsible 
parties[25]. In addition to the complexity of assessing the costs associated with the environmental 
damages, developing a plan to restore these areas is usually another big challenge. 
2.6  Automatic Identification System (AIS) Technology  
Automatic Identification System (AIS) technology has developed in recent decades 
primarily as a means to improve marine safety and maritime domain awareness (Tetreault, 2005).  
The AIS technology uses the VHF radio spectrum to broadcast and receive (ship-to-ship,  
ship-to-shore, and shore-to-ship) real-time information concerning vessel identities,  
dimensions, positions, speeds, and headings among other fields (USCG Navigation Center: 
http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/). The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) (46 
USC §§70113, 70114) mandates AIS carriage requirement by commercial vessels operating in or 
bound for U.S. waters. The U.S. Coast Guard has implemented this requirement through 
regulations in 33 CFR § 164.  The Coast Guard also enforces these and other equipment carriage 
requirements, is involved in developing standards for AIS message formatting, and has established 
an archive of historical AIS data as part of its NAIS program.  
MTS travel time statistics for maintained navigable waterways can be compiled for 
different classes of vessel and by direction (inbound/outbound; upstream/downstream) via a 
straightforward comparison of the time-stamped position reports as unique vessels move through 
the various geo-fenced watch areas of interest [5].  Some recent examples of archival AIS data 
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applied in this fashion, as well as practical methods for dealing with some of the issues encountered 
with travel time outliers can be found in [26] [27] [28]. A similar treatment of AIS data can also 
be applied to derive dwell time estimates for vessels within a defined bounded region [29].  This 
can be done by comparing the time stamp of the first observed vessel position report within a 
defined area to the time stamp of the subsequently first observed report outside the defined area. 
This approach can be applied at a variety of spatial scales, from specific berthing terminals or 
waterway segments to entire port zones, though care must be taken to ensure the AIS data coverage 
in the area is thorough and reliable.   
2.7  Applications of Nationwide Automatic Identification System (NAIS) Data  
The use of archival NAIS records as a remote-sensing technology to infer aspects of 
navigation system performance has become more frequent in recent years. Numerous studies have 
used archival AIS position reports to measure or estimate environmental impacts of shipping, such 
as air emissions [30] [31] and whale strikes [32] . Schwehr and McGillivary [1] explored the use 
of the AIS to track illegal oil releases from vessels and provide real-time monitoring of traffic to 
improve incident response times and management. Hatch et al.[33] used AIS data to estimate the 
impact of large ocean-going vessels on noise levels near shipping lanes in a national marine 
sanctuary off the coast of Massachusetts. Dobbins and Langsdon [16] used AIS data as proof of 
concept for vessel trip generation to improve on existing data sources (e.g., U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers Waterborne Commerce statistics and Lock Performance Monitoring System) in the 
vicinity of Paducah, Kentucky, along the lower Ohio River. Shu et al. [34] used Show Route 
software, developed by the Marine Research Institute, Rotterdam, The Netherlands, to investigate 
forcing factors that affected ship path and speed. For its Atlantic Coast Port Access Route Study, 
the USCG  used aggregated NAIS data to provide a detailed map of shipping lanes along the 
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Atlantic coast [35]. Calder and Schwehr [36] investigated the use of NAIS data to inform risk 
management strategies across a variety of spatial and temporal domains. Mitchell and Scully [6] 
used archival NAIS data to assess tidal influence on vessels that call at deep-draft coastal ports as 
well as to conduct waterway transit time analysis over a range of spatial and temporal domains. 
2.8  Summary of Literature Review 
Considering the importance of the Marine Transportation System on the nation’s as well as 
international economy, such systems must be designed to be resilient. Previous studies introduced 
techniques to reduce vulnerability (increase survivability) and increase coping capacity of the 
system as a means to improve system’s resiliency. The vulnerability reduction strategies include 
the implementation of robustness, redundancy, diversity, modularity, and rapidity into the system 
network, whereas the scenarios to increase the coping capacity of the system cover 
resourcefulness, collaboration, preparedness and cognition [22].  Along these lines, MTS 
resiliency can perhaps best be measured in terms of time, capacity, cost, and environmental impact. 
By quantifying these measures both before and after a disruptive event, it is possible to measure 
the full impact of the disruption on serviceability (performance level and/or performance loss) and 
recoverability of MTS, by which resiliency level of the system can be measured (resiliency as the 
ratio of recover to loss is furthers discussed in the next chapter). Archival NAIS records as a 
remote-sensing technology have recently been used in several studies to infer aspects of navigation 







CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY 
This research proposes a new methodology to quantify MTS resilience by plotting time-
dependent resiliency figures for commercial ports using a summary of archival AIS data. The 
research methodology in the following section describes what types of data were used for the 
resiliency analysis of marine infrastructure facility, and how the data were collected, organized 
and adopted. Then various metrics and parameters by which resiliency can be measured are 
discussed and examined. Among the several resiliency metrics, this chapter concludes with the 
introduction of time-dependent resiliency analysis of ports. Each of the above methodology 
component was described in the following section. 
3.1 Data Collection and Processing  
 Historical AIS data is developed by U.S. Coast Guard as part of its NAIS program. Archival 
AIS data sets used in this study were obtained by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) 
through a suite of NAIS web services, made available to the Corps as part of a standing interagency 
service agreement (ISA).  Manual real-time and archival data requests can be made to the Coast 
Guard’s Navigation Center, pursuant to agency terms concerning requesting entity, intended use 
of the data, and disclosure to third parties (www.navcen.uscg.gov/?pageName=NAISdisclaimer). 
There are also numerous commercial vendors of both real-time and archival AIS data, and 
transceiver units needed to broadcast and receive AIS messages are readily available for purchase 
to those seeking to collect their own data. The adapted archival NAIS data in this study were used 
to analyze resiliency levels of port operations experiencing disruptive events at three stages of pre-
event, during-event, and post-event. Two metrics were introduced to measure the system resiliency 
levels at different stages: vessel dwell time resiliency (RDT), and net vessel transit count resiliency 
(RTC) into and out of the port area, respectively.  
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3.2 Metrics and Parameters of Resiliency  
 Vessel location information from onboard AIS transceivers is used to generate two 
performance indicators, average “vessel dwell time” within the port areas of interest and net 
“vessel transits” into and out of the port areas of interest.  Dwell time represents the continuous 
length of time a vessel spends within the port area or associated regions such as offshore 
anchorages. In terms of freight throughput efficiency, dwell time indicates the “capability of the 
port to efficiently handle cargo flows at the terminals and beyond” [37]. Decreases in port 
performance following a disruption tend to limit the rate at which vessels can be processed, thereby 
extending the overall average vessel dwell time within the greater port area.  The net number of 
vessels within a port area is obtained from a running tally of vessels both entering and departing 
the port area and surrounding zones.  In the case of port terminals handling cargo, this quantity 
can indicate relative rates of freight throughput (loading and unloading of vessels) at any point in 
time; whereas in the case of anchorages where vessels typically wait for berthing slots to open 
within the port area, this quantity can indicate backlogs and excessive delay owing to disruptions 
in port operations.  It should be noted that there may also be external factors influencing the 
resiliency performance measures, such as use of anchorages by vessels for reasons (e.g. bunkering 
and lightering operations) unrelated to the MTS disruption. Here the two performance measures 
(average vessel dwell time and net vessel transits into and out of the port) provide general trends 
in the efficiency of overall port operations and the associated maintained waterways. By estimating 
and plotting the resiliency in terms of these two metrics for the days and weeks before and after 
major disruptive events, additional analysis can be conducted on the recovery efforts and their 




3.3 Time-Dependent Resiliency Analysis 
Figure 3 illustrates a general description of different states a system undergoes after 
occurrence of disruptive events.  A generic time-dependent resiliency plot is shown in figure 3a 
for an increasing service system and figure 3b for a decreasing service system [15]. An increasing 
service system is one where network output is positively correlated with service; that is, as the 
output increases, so too does the service provided. An example of this is a production process 
where output, in terms of units built increases with the overall service of the production line. A 
decreasing service system is one where the network output is negatively correlated with the 
service. An example of this is dwell times; if a system is performing well, then dwell times should 
be minimized. In Figure 3a and 3b, a system, noted as 𝑆 is analyzed before, during, and after a 
disruptive event. System  𝑆 experiences three steady states (the original state 𝑆𝑜 , the disrupted 
state 𝑆𝑑, and the stable state 𝑆𝑟), and two transitional states (where the systems transitions from 
normal steady state to the disrupted state and another from the disrupted state back to the recovered 
stable state). These transitions are marked by two events; the first is the onset of the disruptive 
event (𝑒𝑗) and the second is a recovery action. The figure illustrates how the initial system, as 
measured by its output performance 𝐹(𝑡), initially exists in a steady state. Then, due to the onset 
of a disruptive event 𝑒𝑗, transitions into a disrupted state. Finally, after the start of a recovery event, 




Figure 3a. Increasing service system function [15] 
 
 
Figure 3b. Decreasing service system function [15] 
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Furthermore, Figure 1 points out four behavioral features of a resilient networked system in the 
face of a shock, as described below: [38]  
- Reliability: refers to the system’s behavior during time period (t0 – te), while there is no 
external disruptive event. It corresponds to the system time to failure in the face of a 
disruption at time td.  
- Survivability:  refers to the system’s behavior after the occurrence of a disruptive event. A 
more resilient system maintains system service continuity so that potential disruptions are 
minimized.  Several techniques have been developed to increase a system’s survivability 
in the face of a shock, or in other words, to help the system become robust to external 
attacks [39], through general architecture features like adaptability (ability to change as to 
better accommodate new condition) and flexibility (ability to adapt to a range of adverse 
unexpected events).  
- Vulnerability: refers to the interaction between a disruptive event and the system 
performance in order to size the specific system performance loss (Crucitti et al, 2005), 
(Zhang et al, 2011), (Nagurney and Qiang, 2008), (Zio et al, 2008). By addressing such 
negative impacts, those system elements generating the highest damage when disrupted 
can be identified. Diagnosis of these points of system vulnerability, which are essentially 
responsible for the maximum reduction of service performance, has been the subject of 
many recent studies. 
- Recoverability: refers to the ability of the system to recover after a disruptive event. Rose 
(2007) describes dynamic recoverability as “the speed at which a system recovers from a 
severe shock to achieve a desired state”. While there are several studies in this area, there 
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is still a gap in research related to the stochastic behavior of recovery in general networked 
systems [38].  
Based on the previous discussion and to help fill current research gaps, this study adopted the 
resiliency equation developed by Henry and Ramirez Marques (2012) to estimate the resiliency 
levels of waterborne infrastructure systems in the face of a given shock. In the Ramirez-Marquez 
equation (EQ.5), resilience is given the notation of Я (as R is already used for reliability) and 
computed at any time(ti) after disruptive event (ej) as the ratio of the system’s specific performance 
(F) recovered by time (ti) over the maximum service loss of the system occurring at time (td).  The 
Ramirez-Marquez equation can be used if and only if the system is hit by an external disruptive 
event (ej) capable of affecting system’s original state (S0). As seen in Figure 1, once the system is 
disrupted by an event (ej) at time (te), a period of specific service degradation of length (td – te) 
shifts the system down from its original stable state (S0) with corresponding performance F(t0) to 
a disrupted state (Sd) with the corresponding performance F(td). Once entering the disrupted state 
(Sd) at time (td), the system continues to function under the maximum disrupted state for a length 
of time (ts –td), after which the system restoration begins until it reaches a recovered stable state 
(Sr) with corresponding performance level F(tr).  In his equation, Ramirez-Marquez calculated the 
system resiliency at any time 𝑡𝑖 after event 𝑒
𝑗 , as follows: [4] 
 Я𝐹 (𝑡𝑖)  =  Recovery(𝑡𝑖) / Loss (𝑡𝑑) (EQ. 4) 
 
Я𝐹(𝑡𝑖|𝑒
𝑗) =  
 𝐹(𝑡𝑖) −  𝐹(𝑡𝑑) 
𝐹(𝑡0) −  𝐹(𝑡𝑑)








𝐹(𝑡𝑖)  = the performance of the system at time 𝑡𝑖 
𝐹(𝑡𝑑)   = the performance of the system at time 𝑡𝑑 , corresponding to the time of maximum 
system service loss 
𝐹(𝑡0)   = the performance of the system at time 𝑡0, corresponding to the original state 
𝐷  = set of all disruptive events which could hinder service 







𝑗) indicates the proportion of service which has been 




𝑗) is zero, indicating that the system has not recovered from its disrupted state; 
(3) when the value of Я
𝐹
(𝑡𝑖|𝑒




𝑗) is undefined when 𝐹(𝑡0) = 𝐹(𝑡𝑑), this indicates that no drop in performance was 
measured as a result of event 𝑒𝑗  , and therefore 𝑒𝑗 is not an element of disruptive state (𝐷). This 
model enables quantifying and tracking the changes in the network state as a function of time and 
accurately observing the network response to the recovery strategies employed. Using this metric, 
decision makers can dynamically assess their resilience-building decisions during the after-math 
of a disruption [4]. 
The degree of disruption is used as a mean to quantify resiliency in the context of this 
study. Figure 3d plots the hypothetical rate of change of system’s specific performance over time 





Figure 3d.  Hypothetical illustration of the rate of change of system’s specific performance over time  
 
The derivative of the resiliency function is a measure of the rate of change of specific service 
output by the system. Initially the system is operating in the original stable state, and the derivative 
of the resiliency function (
𝑑Я𝐹
𝑑𝑡
) is equal to zero during this original stable state. The transitive 
vulnerable state begins after the occurrence of the disruptive event and when the derivative of the 
resiliency function drops to less than zero ( 
𝑑Я𝐹
𝑑𝑡
< 0) in an increasing service system. A larger 
negative magnitude derivative (steeper negative slope) in the transitive vulnerable state indicates 
an inability of the system to absorb and withstand the shock without being impacted. This suggests 
that the higher the absolute magnitude of the derivative during this transitive state, the less resilient 
the system is. The disrupted state is immediately preceded by a negative derivative resulting from 
the initial loss of service, and is marked by a derivative equal to zero when entering the stable 
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> 0), indicating the impacts of the recovery action on the system’s performance. 
The higher the magnitude of the derivative (steeper positive slope) during the transitional 
recoverability state, the more responsive the system is to the recovery action taken, and the more 
resilient the system is. After this point, the system begins entering the stable recovered state, 
marked by a decreasing derivative ( 
𝑑Я𝜑
𝑑𝑡





CHAPTER 4.  EMPIRICAL APPLICATION 
To demonstrate the versatility of the proposed methodology, two empirical case studies are 
presented here. The first applies the methodology to a no-notice event (an event with no warning 
time) which was triggered by a collision between an oceangoing bulk carrier vessel and a tow of 
fuel barges in the Houston Ship Channel on March 22, 2014. The second case study demonstrates 
the methodology on a pre-notice event (warning time is greater than 24 hours), the closure of 
harbor operations in the greater Port of New York/New Jersey resulting from Superstorm Sandy 
on October 28, 2012.  
4.1 Galveston Channel Closure 
On March 22, 2014, the 607-foot long bulk carrier Summer Wind collided with a tank-barge 
being pushed by the Miss Susan near the end of the Texas City Dike in Lower Galveston Bay.  The 
collision was caused primarily by heavy fog in the area, and it resulted in about 4,000 barrels 
(168,000 gallons) of fuel oil spilling into the waterway [40]. During the ensuing channel closure 
for cleanup operations, pilot services were suspended and oceangoing vessels began queuing up 
in the various anchorage areas near the entrance to Galveston Bay.  This study uses a set of NAIS 
data covering January-June 2014 for cargo and tankers transiting in the vicinity of the intersection 
of the Houston Ship Channel with the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway (GIWW).  To keep data file 
sizes and processing times manageable, the temporal sampling rates vary from 5 minutes to 1 hour, 
depending on the amount of time each vessel was within range of shore-based AIS towers. In 
Figure 4a, density plots of vessel traffic are shown for the overall Galveston Bay port area (inset) 
as well as the offshore anchorages where vessels queue up while waiting for pilots and/or berthing 
slots to open at the various port terminals in Galveston, Texas City, or Houston.  The small box in 
the inset map shows the general location of the collision in March 2014.  It should be noted that 
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the density plots reflect the relative number of AIS position reports per unit area, but they do not 
necessarily indicate higher numbers of unique vessels.  The inbound and outbound traffic fairways 
can also be seen bisecting the two offshore anchorage areas. 
Figure 4a. AIS density plot of vessel traffic near the Galveston Entrance Channel, March 2014 
A large watch area encompassing both of the offshore anchorage areas seen in Figure 4a was used 
as the basis for AIS-derived dwell time observations and a rolling vessel entrance/exit tally during 
the 6-month study period.  As previously described, the dwell time observations are taken as the 
difference in the time stamps of vessel position reports when first appearing within and 
subsequently outside of the watch area.  Some (manageable) dwell time error is introduced by the 
differing sampling rates used for unique vessels, which vary between 5 minutes and 1-hr for vessels 
Vessels queued up in offshore 
anchorages during closure of 
Houston Ship Channel, March 2014 
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within range of AIS receiving towers.  Figure 4b shows the total number of days that the port was 
closed during the 6-month study period. Note that some of the closure times in the figure represent 
service disruptions in different parts of the greater Galveston Bay port area, and do not necessarily 
represent closures of the entire waterway system.  The post-collision disruption that is the focus 
of this study is indicated by the red arrow.  Presumably, the fact that this closure was continuous 
and affected the entrance to the entire Houston-Galveston-Texas City port zone led to the 
significant disruptions to overall vessel traffic seen by the average dwell time and net transit count 
increases in the outer anchorages. Note that the multiple closures during February, likely due to 
foggy weather conditions, also appear to have taken their toll on the overall port area performance.  
 
Figure 4b. No. of days Galveston bay was closed during the 6-month study period 
 Figure 5 shows the weekly average vessel dwell times and the number of inbound and 
outbound vessels within the offshore watch area for the six-month period encompassing the vessel 
collision. The disruptive event date (March 22, 2014) is shown on the figure with a solid line. This 
period coincides with an imbalance in the number of inbound and outbound vessels and subsequent 
increases in the average vessel dwell time. An unexpected finding of note includes an earlier 
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increase in average vessel dwell time (noted by the dotted-dashed line) five weeks prior to the 
collision event. Channel closure records obtained from officials with the Houston-Galveston 
Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) show that cumulative weekly closure durations were actually higher 
in February 2014, mostly due to fog, than they were in March 2014, even after taking the post- 
collision closure into account.   
Figure 5. Six-month vessel traffic summary for Galveston offshore anchorage area 
Some of the closures represent service disruptions in different parts of the greater Galveston Bay 
port area, and they do not necessarily represent closures of the entire waterway system.  The post-
collision disruption that is the focus of this study is indicated by the solid line.  Presumably, the 
fact that this closure was continuous and affected the entrance to the entire Houston-Galveston-
Texas City port zone led to the significant disruptions to overall vessel traffic seen by the average 
dwell time and net transit count increases in the outer anchorages.  
Figure 6a shows the daily average dwell times in the Galveston entrance outer anchorages 
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to the closure of the channel for a four-day period. On March 27, 2014 (shown with a dotted line) 
the channel was partially reopened and then completely opened on April 7, 2014 (shown with a 
dashed line). The figure shows that prior to the event, the outer anchorage area was in the original 
state condition. The system reached the full disrupted state starting on March 23, 2014. On March 
27th a recovery action was taken (the partial reopening of the channel), which began the transition 
between the disruptive state and the stable state. Finally, the system reached the stable state around 
April 7, 2014. 
Figure 6a. Galveston Dwell Times  
Figure 6b shows the resiliency, as calculated from Equation 1, for each day after the 
disruptive event. This analysis demonstrates that the recovery action (dotted line) was effective as 
a means of increasing the resiliency of the system. Then, over the ensuing days the resiliency of 
the system fluctuates until it again reaches its stable state (dashed line). For this demonstration, 
the original state is quantified as the average vessel dwell time the day prior to the incident. Future 
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work will incorporate a more statistically robust measure of steady-state, pre-disruption port 
operations. 
 
Figure 6b. Galveston Dwell Time Resiliency 
Figure 6c shows the derivative of the Galveston dwell time resiliency, or in other words, 
changes in port dwell time performance per day as the unit of time. As expected, the figure 
represents a dwell time in an initial stable state before the event date, which then transitions into a 
disruptive state with a negative derivative value. It appears that the transition occurred on March 
22nd and continues until a day after. On March 23rd, the system begins to enter the stable disruptive 
state, as noted by a spike in the derivative value. Once in the stable disrupted state, the derivative 
is shown varying between +0.20 and -0.22, indicating that stochastic systems performance is 
essentially unchanged during this interval of nine days. The derivative function then indicates that 
effects of the recover action taken on March 26th were not observed to have an impact on port 
















until April 7th, when the port is reopened, which corresponds to another spike in the derivate 
function. 
 
Figure 6c. Rate of change of system’s dwell time resiliency, Galveston Bay, oil spill of March 2014 
 
 Figure 6d shows the daily number of inbound and outbound vessels through the Galveston 
offshore anchorages for the same period. Also shown in the figure (with solid, dotted, and dashed 
lines) are the event day, partial reopening, and full opening of the channel. Looking at the 
cumulative inbound and outbound number of vessels, a sharp drop is seen on the incident day. 
This drop continues (marking the start of the transitional state) until March 25, 2014, where the 
systems enters the disruptive state. It is important to note that the beginning and ending of the 
disruptive state occur on the same days as shown in Figure 6a. After March 26, 2014 the system 
begins transitioning, and by the time of the full reopening on April 7, 2014, the system is in its 




Figure 6d. Galveston Net Vessel Transit Counts 
 Figure 6e displays the daily net vessel transit count (capacity usage) resiliency, as 
calculated from Equation 1, based on vessels entering and exiting the offshore anchorages. In 
general, the net transit count resiliency of the system performed in a similar manner to the dwell 
time resiliency, with corresponding peaks and valleys, to some extent. This is an expected finding 
considering the relationship between dwell time and the number of inbound and outbound vessels.  
 














highly- disrupted state 
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Figure 6f shows the derivative of the Galveston net transit count resiliency, or in other 
words, changes in port transit count performance per day as the unit of time. As shown in the 
figure, the system transitions from a normal stable state into a disruptive state on the day of the 
event, with 72 percent decrease in total number of vessels processed by the port on March 22nd. 
Once in the disrupted state, the derivative is shown varying between -0.19 and +0.22 in the first 
four days after the event. Then after the recovery action taken on March 26th, the derivative is 
shown to have a major fluctuation between March 27th and March 30th (varying between -0.67 and 
+0.78), indicating the impacts of the recovery actions on the system’s performance. Four days after 
the initial recovery action, the derivative is shown to be almost steady (-0.14) for three days, 
indicating that the system’s performance is unchanged between March 30th and April 1st.   After 
another set of fluctuations between April 2nd and April 6th (varying between -0.44 and +0.33), -
which might be due to another phase of recovery action- the system stabilizes once again until 
April 7th, when the port is reopened, which corresponds to another spike in the derivate. 
  




4.2 New York / New Jersey Channel Closure 
The Port of New York and New Jersey, which spans both the New York and New Jersey 
sides of New York harbor, is the third largest port in the U.S. and the largest port on the Atlantic 
coast (PANYNJ n.d.). In late October 2012, New York harbor was significantly disrupted and 
damaged by Superstorm Sandy as that unusual extra-tropical system moved slowly up the U.S. 
eastern seaboard. In preparation for the storm, the port was shut down in the evening of October 
28, 2012 and remained closed for almost 8 days. This is an example of the pre-notified event in 
which vessels were notified about the closure of the port facilities in the following days due to the 
big storm.  
For this study, NAIS data was usedand the data was filtered  for analysis of cargos and 
tankers transiting the Arthur Kill area of New York Harbor during a 6-month period (August 2012 
– January 2013) encompassing the landfall of Superstorm Sandy. The sampling rate for unique 
vessels ranged from 5-minutes to 15 minutes, depending on the amount of time each vessel was 
within range of AIS receiving towers.   
Figure 7 shows the AIS density plot of vessel traffic and position reports within the greater 
New York area based on the summery set of NAIS data obtained for this study.  The small red box 
near the center of the figure shows the area that was queried for NAIS archival data; all vessels 
transiting this box were tracked for the full 6-month study period.  The larger bounded region 
indicated by the gray polygon encompassing the greater New York metropolitan area shows the 




Figure 7. Density plot of AIS position reports in greater New York Harbor, watch area used for post-
Sandy resiliency analysis, and bounded region (red box) used for NAIS data collection 
 Figure 8 shows the weekly average vessel dwell times and the number of inbound and 
outbound vessels for New York Harbor during the six-month study period. The day of the closure 
(October 28, 2012) and the day the harbor was reopened (November 4, 2012) are shown with solid 
and dashed lines, respectively. In the week leading up to the closure, a drop in the number of 
vessels can be seen, likely due to vessels routing away from the harbor in advance of the storm. 
Also shown prior to the closure is an increase in vessel dwell time, also likely due to storm 
preparations. From the figure it can be seen that the port returns to “normal” operations by the 




Figure 8. Six-month vessel traffic summary for New York harbor area 
Figure 9a shows New York Harbor average daily dwell times from October 15, 2012 to 
November 20, 2012. The closure of the harbor began on October 28 (shown with a solid line), 
Superstorm Sandy made landfall the following day on October 29, and the port reopened on 
November 4 (shown on the figure with a dashed line). From the figure it can be seen that vessel 
dwell times started to decrease a week prior to the incident and that the vessel average dwell times 
did not immediately increase following the closure. This is in contrast to the no-notice event which 
took place in Galveston Bay, which saw a drastic increase in dwell times immediately following 
that incident. However, in the ensuing days after Sandy, average dwell times for the greater New 
York port area increased as vessels begin to queue, waiting for the port operations to reopen. By 











































Figure 9a. Greater New York Port Area Dwell Times 
Figure 9b shows the dwell time resiliency for each day after the harbor closure. The figure 
begins on October 23, 2012, a few days prior to the closure to provide a reference. The day of the 
port closure, the reopening day of the port, and the day by which the port were fully recovered are 
shown in the figure with a solid, dashed, and dotted line, respectively. After the closure of the port, 
the system transitions into a disruptive state, reaching its maximum disruptive state between 
October 29 and October 31, 2012. The ultimate recovery event was the reopening of the harbor, 
after which the vessel activity began the transition into a stable state, and essentially normal 




Figure 9b. Greater New York Port Area Dwell Time Resiliency 
Figure 9c shows the derivative of the New York port dwell time resiliency, or in other 
words, the rate of change of port dwell time resiliency per day as the unit of time. The figure shows 
a drop from the initial stable state two days prior to the incident day, due to vessels notified to 
route away from the port. The system then transitions into a disruptive state on October 28th and 
enters the steady disrupted state on October 30th. The system remains in its fully disrupted state 
from October 30th to November 2nd, with the derivative varying between -0.03 and +0.15, 
indicating that stochastic systems performance is almost unchanged during this interval of four 
days. After the recovery action taken on November 4th, the system transitions from a disrupted 
state to stabilize once again until November 7th, when the port is fully reopened. The derivative 
function also indicates some fluctuations in port dwell time resiliency for another week until 





Figure 9c. Rate of change of system’s dwell time resiliency, NY/NJ Harbor, 2012 
 Figure 9d shows the daily number of inbound and outbound vessels through the greater 
New York port area between October 15 and November 22, 2012. The figure displays the harbor 
closure and reopening with solid and dashed lines, respectively. Looking at the cumulative inbound 
and outbound number of vessels, a sharp drop is seen on the day of the closure.  
 
Figure 9d. Greater New York Port Area Net Vessel Transit Counts 
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 Figure 9e displays the daily net vessel transit count resiliency, as calculated from Equation 
1, for the New York Harbor. Again, as seen during the Galveston Bay disruption, the starting and 
ending days of the various states in the resiliency process (stable state, disruptive state, and 
transitive states) are the same between the dwell time and net vessel count resiliency figures.   
 
Figure 9e. Greater New York Port Area Net Vessel Transit Count Resiliency 
Figure 9f shows the derivative of the New York Port transit count resiliency. Similar to the 
dwell time resiliency derivative diagram, the figure shows a drop from the initial stable state prior 
to the incident, due to vessels routing away from the port. The system then transitions into a 
disruptive state on October 28th, with an 88 percent decreasing rate from its normal serviceability. 
The system enters into its fully disrupted state on October 30th and remains almost fully disrupted 
until November 2nd. During the stable disrupted state, the derivative is shown varying between  
-0.06 and +0.12, indicating that stochastic systems performance is relatively unchanged during the 
interval of October 30th to November 3rd.  Once the recovery action is taken on November 4th, the 
system transitions from a disrupted state to stabilize once again until November 7th, when the port 






Figure 9f. Rate of change of system’s transit count resiliency, NY/NJ Harbor, 2012 
When comparing these two events from a resiliency stand-point, several notable 
differences can be seen. First, in the days leading up to Superstorm Sandy, there was a gradual 
increase in the number of exiting vessels. This shows that many of the large tankers and cargo 
ships evacuated prior to the arrival of the storm. No such evacuation was possible prior to the 
incident which took place in Galveston Bay. Also, since the New York Harbor closure was 
scheduled in preparation for the storm, the drop off in port performance was drastic. This is in 
contrast to the Galveston Bay example, in which vessels were still able to access the anchorage 
areas offshore of the Galveston Entrance channel both before and after the incident. This 
manifested itself in a more gradual drop off in port system performance. Furthermore, it would 
appear that approximately 48-72 hours after the New York Harbor was reopened, the vessel traffic 
and dwell times returned to pre-event levels. The same cannot be said for the no-warning event in 




CHAPTER 5.  CONCLUSIONS 
Despite best efforts to mitigate the risks and effects of catastrophic events, future 
disruptions will continue to cause significant losses to maritime infrastructure and efficiency.  For 
this reason, it is essential that MTS stakeholders continue to improve the design and operation of 
port and waterway facilities and their associated infrastructure to minimize losses and maintain 
functionality in cases of disruption and major disasters. A key aspect in improving system 
resiliency is to identify robust and objective performance evaluation methods. To this end, the 
research presented herein has been developed from USCG Automatic Identification System (AIS) 
data to create new methods and metrics for the assessment of resiliency in maritime systems. This 
methodology advances the field of disaster science by expanding on the concepts first proposed 
by Henry and Ramirez-Marquez (2012) and Baroud et al. (2014), and applying these methods to 
empirical observations.  
In general, the results of the research show that AIS, which collects information from 
nearly all commercial vessels on a semi-continuous basis data, is an excellent source for 
quantitative data when seeking post-disaster measures of resiliency. The time-dependent 
performance models developed from this data show the cascading effects of disruptions and 
demonstrate how it can be used to quantify the MTS resiliency levels in terms of dwell time metric 
and net transit counts. One of the more interesting findings of this effort was the manner in which 
the data show, in quantifiable terms, reductions in performance resulting from incremental, less-
publicized disruptions (Feb. 2014 at Galveston Bay) and evidence, albeit limited, of the benefits 
of advanced warning prior to a disruptive event. It is worth noting that the proposed approach can 
also be applied toward longer-period disruptions. The recent West Coast labor dispute and 
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associated port slowdowns in late 2014 and early 2015 provide a prime example of the need for 
unbiased analysis and can be studied within the context of this research in future work. 
This study adopted a summary of AIS data and employed the resiliency equation 
introduced by Remirez-Marquez to obtain empirical observations. Using this methodology, the 
purpose of this study was to quantify the resiliency level of a specific waterborne facility after the 
occurrence of a particular disruption. The methodology employed in this study can further be used 
to carry out an economic impact assessment of the disruptive event by estimating the likely 
economic costs associated with the disruption, including the economic impact of MTS closures. 
The methodology herein did not account for the severity of the disruptive event, as the disruption 
and the disrupted port were both assumed to be known and given for the purpose of this study. The 
author may expand the formulation of resiliency used in this study in her future work to reflect the 
impacts of different disruptions in port performance by introducing other factors in the current 
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